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Abstract. The first attempts of the European Commission and Parliament to invoke Art. 7(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union against the Polish and Hungarian governments demonstrate the EU’s political willingness to 
claim its own authority in defending core European values (Art. 2 TEU) in case of state disobedience. However, 
despite these attempts to integrate the Rule of Law concept into the overall EU’s supervisory machinery, the 
Commission’s and the Parliament’s submissions indicate a lack of coherency in implementing the principle as a 
relevant tool to address multiple challenges arising within the EU Member States legal systems. The parallel 
developments in the CJEUs case-law (LM/ML, Torubarov) support this statement. Regardless of the Council’s yes/
no decisions in the Polish and Hungarian cases, these lines of reasoning are capable of giving rise to further 
questions in application of the European Arrest Warrant Framework decision or the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
in particular the EU Member States which remain within the scope of the EU’s attention in view of systemic 
Human Rights violations (Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia). Moreover, the series of the CJEU’s judgements on 
the Polish judicial reform are capable of paving the way to the de facto intervention into traditional areas of the EU 
Member States competence – the organisation of the national judicial systems, in light of the development of a 
EU-specific principle of effective judicial review.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Law principle has been interpreted as part of the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States since the first days of the European Union’s formation.1 
This stems from their participation in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); 
their obligation to follow case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)2 and 
thus, from the broader perspective, is also rooted in the European legal culture.3 The EU 
legislatory and the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) have adopted a traditional approach to the 
Rule of Law concept being a tool to respond to the arbitrary use of state power whilst 
     *   Postdoctoral researcher, Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht mit internationaler Ausrichtung, 
Universität Konstanz, PhD in Comparative and Transnational Law, Scuola Superiore Sant ‘Anna 
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and is current as of 31 July 2019. The author would like to thank Dr. Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz, Dr. Ernő 
Várnay, Dr. Márton Varju, Dr. Balázs Fekete, Dr. Mónika Papp and Dr. Emese Szilágyi for their 
constructive comments on the earlier version of the paper draft. All possible mistakes remain the sole 
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1 Pech (2009) 4–5, 22–46.
2 Art. 46 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 supplemented by Protocols Nos 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13 
(European Convention on Human Rights) [1950] Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. For the res 
interpretata effect of the European Court of Human Rights Judgments, see for example Arnardóttir 
(2017) 819–43.
3 Schroeder (2016) 5–27.
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considering the specificity of the EU’s sui generis legal order.4 Hence, this general principle 
of EU Law aimed to guarantee an effective protection of natural and legal persons against 
illegal acts of the EU and of EU Member States acting within the scope of EU Law.5
While the EU has direct legal authority to guarantee the compliance of the Member 
States with this principle via the Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) mechanism, 
primarily indirect means of pressure i.e., the infringement procedures6 were resorted to for 
a long period of time.7 The first attempts of the European Commission and Parliament to 
invoke Art. 7(1) TEU8 against the Polish and the Hungarian government thus demonstrate 
the EU’s political willingness to claim its own authority in defending core European values 
in the national legal systems. The Rule of Law concept seems to be the main tool for these 
interventions. Two key EU institutions built their reasoning around this notion while trying 
to convince the Council to determine the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by 
Poland and Hungary of the rule of law9 ‘and values on which the Union is founded’.10
Despite these attempts to integrate the Rule of Law concept into the overall EU’s 
supervisory machinery, the Commission’s and the Parliament’s submissions arguably 
indicate a lack of coherency in approaching the principle as a relevant tool to address 
multiple challenges in the EU Member States’ legal systems.11 The author claims that the 
approach of the pending Art. 7(1) TEU proposals differs significantly as the Commission’s 
reasoning (Poland) is rather well founded, whilst the Parliament’s argumentation (Hungary) 
seems incomparably less convincing and more policy-oriented. The parallel developments 
in the CJEU’s case-law (LM/ML, Torubarov) give rise to further questions regarding 
the application of the European Arrest Warrant Framework decision or the 
Asylum Procedures Directive – in particular, in the States which remain within the scope of 
the EU’s attention in view of systemic Human Rights violations (Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia).12 Moreover, the series of CJEU judgements on the Polish judicial reform are 
capable of paving the way to a de facto intervention into traditional areas of the EU Member 
States’ competence, namely the organisation of the national judicial systems, developing an 
EU-specific principle of effective judicial review.
To illustrate these developments the substance of the Rule of Law principle in the EU’s 
autonomous legal order is analysed in view of its origins and the rationales behind its 
gaining a foothold in EU Law. This paper then probes the reasoning adopted by the 
European Commission (Poland) and by the Parliament (Hungary) proposals in accordance 
  4 Pech (2009) 5. 
  5 Jakab (2016) 188–89.
  6 Arts. 258–260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
  7 Halmai (2018) 10, 15.
  8 Mangiameli and Saputelli (2013) 349–74.
  9 The Proposal of the European Commission for a Council decision on the determination of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law [2017] COM 835 final.
10 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)03 40.
11 Michelot (2017) link 1.
12 In this sense, see for example The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard [2018] Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM 364 final, Šelih, Bond and 
Dolan (2017).
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with Art. 7(1) TEU submitted to the Council. The author then analyses the simultaneously 
forming body of CJEU case-law on the European Arrest Warrant (LM/ML), 
Asylum Procedures Directive (Torubarov), and the reform of the Polish Supreme Court and 
Ordinary Courts. The concluding part of the paper contains the author’s final remarks on 
the deriving challenges for the Rule of Law concept implementation in the EU’s autonomous 
legal order, in view of the approach adopted by the Commission, Parliament and the CJEU.
2. THE CONCEPT OF RULE OF LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Rule of Law is often defined as a constitutional principle of the EU,13 occupying a 
central place among the EU’s common values enshrined in Art. 2 and Art. 6 TEU, as well as 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). The stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, Human Rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities remain the key eligibility conditions for a state’s accession to the 
Union (Art. 49 TEU, the Copenhagen criteria).14 The main tool used to enforce these values 
is the EU Acquis chapter system;15 the special emphasis of Chapters 23 (‘Judiciary and 
fundamental rights’) and 24 (‘Justice, freedom and security’) in the current round of access 
negotiations demonstrates the EU’s growing awareness of the Rule of Law issues which 
could potentially arise in new Member States’ national legal systems.16
The key components of this umbrella concept were gradually incorporated in the EU 
legal order by the CJEU, thus making the conduct of the EU’s institutions and/or the 
Member States’ authorities acting within the scope of European Law subject to procedural 
and substantive limitations.17 The sui generis nature of the EU’s autonomous legal 
order defined the CJEU’s legal reasoning: the Court seemed to have transposed the core 
components of the classic Montesquieu/Rechtsstaat theories whilst simultaneously 
considering the EU-specific rationales and legal machinery.18 With time, the CJEU 
elaborated the concept of the Rule of Law comprising such elements as the access to justice 
and judicial review, legal certainty, proportionality, equality and non-discrimination and 
transparency19 in order to guarantee the effective judicial protection of the EU individual,20 
as well as the effectiveness of EU Law within national legal systems of the EU Member 
States.21
13 Pech (2010) 359.
14 Famous eligibility conditions have been developed by the European Council in the so-called 
Copenhagen Criteria (1993): (1) the political criteria – the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, Human Rights and respect for and protection of minorities, (2) the 
economic criteria – ability to face up to the pressure of the European Union market and competition 
and (3) the institutional criteria – an ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the 
capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law 
(the acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.
15 In this sense, see for example Hillion (2016) 59–81; Sadurski (2016) 123–41; Gateva (2015) 
7–37.
16 Hillion (2013) 5–7.
17 Schroeder (2016) 5–9.
18 Pech (2009) 32–40.
19 Von Danwitz (2014) 1314–16.
20 Reich (2005) 112–15.
21 Prechal / Widdershoven (2011) 39–40.
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 06/16/21 01:51 PM UTC
RULE OF LAW VS. POLAND AND HUNGARY — AN INCONSISTENT APPROACH? 239
In accordance with the current Treaty framework, the EU has two key legal options to 
verify and remedy the arising Rule of Law violations in the Member States.
1. The Commission has the power to launch infringement proceedings on the basis of 
Arts. 258–260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) against any 
Member State that fails to comply with EU Law. If necessary, the matter may be referred to 
the CJEU so financial sanctions can be imposed. Infringement procedures remain the key 
supervisory mechanism of the Treaties but the Commission primarily aims at a correct and 
timely transposition of EU legislation into national legislation.22 Thus it seems reluctant to 
fully protect fundamental rights, concentrating on less sensitive technical issues of the 
internal market.23
2. The ‘nuclear option’ 24 of Art. 7 TEU was specifically included in the EU primary 
law as a mean to guarantee that any Member State respects not only the Treaty provisions 
as such, but also the common values captured in Art. 2 TEU – including the compliance 
with the Rule of Law principle.25 Art. 7 TEU comprises the preventive (Art. 7(1) – 
determining a clear risk of a breach) and the sanctioning arms (Art. 7(2) – a serious and 
persistent breach of the common EU’s values by a Member State).26 Art. 7(1) TEU allows 
the Council (of the EU) to invoke the preventive mechanism at the request of the European 
Parliament, one third of the Member States or of the European Commission. The Council 
then has to make a final decision by a majority of four fifths of its members, after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament.27
The sanctioning limb is more difficult to activate, considering the gravity of political 
and legal consequences of this measure. Art. 7(2) TEU provides that it is for the European 
Council to determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of 
the common EU’s values, acting on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. Importantly, the 
decision on the existence of a breach requires unanimity among the EU heads of state and 
governments, thus each Member State (except for the State concerned by the procedure) 
has a veto right on such a determination.28
The Treaties do not specify a sanction if the preventive mechanism has been invoked 
but Art. 7(3) TEU states that the final decision on activating the sanctioning arm may lead 
to the suspension of certain rights of the Member State concerned, including its voting 
rights in the Council.29 States having no respect to the EU key principles would be exempted 
from influencing the EU decision-making process.30 The Art. 7 TEU procedure is often 
defined as the safeguard clause of the whole EU legal system and is a remedy for an 
extraordinary situation, determined by assessing the compatibility of a Member State’s 
conduct with the core principles of the EU’s legal order.31 As argued by Hillion, the 
22 Art. 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union. 
23 Von Bogdandy et al (2012) link 2.
24 Barroso (2012).
25 Blanke and Mangiameli (2013) 349–55.
26 Bárd (2017) link 3.
27 Art. 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union [2012] OJ C 326.
28 Art. 7(2) TEU; De Schutter, (2017) link 4.
29 Art. 7(3) TEU.
30 Blanke and Mangiameli (2013) 367.
31 Blanke and Mangiameli (2013) 354.
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distinctive feature of Arts. 7(1)–(2) TEU is also the scope of their application:‘in the case of 
the infringement procedure, the failure is more limited and circumstantial, whereas in the 
context of Art. 7 TEU, the breach becomes systematic’.32 Hence, the mechanism is not 
confined only to situations where Member States implement EU Law.33 Although there is 
still no EU’s institutional practice on the matter, the ‘nuclear’ option can arguably serve as 
a basis for more ‘invasive’ interventions than the traditional infringements procedure on the 
basis of TEU, TFEU or even CFREU provisions.34
Importantly, the EU Law guarantees are also complimented by the Council of Europe 
judicial (with the ECtHR as a main guardian of the ECHR proper implementation) and non-
judicial mechanisms of protection (such as the Venice Commission, Steering Committee for 
Human Rights, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice etc).35 The Rule of Law 
checklist adopted by the Venice Commission presented the catalogue of the selected Human 
Rights benchmarks aimed at assessing the ECHR signatories’ compliance with the 
latter principle – thus providing additional guidance for the EU and the EU Member States. 
The criteria developed within the EU and the CoE regimes overlap to a significant extent, 
as the Venice Commission provides a non-exhaustive list of basic guarantees comprising 
the principles of legality,36 legal certainty,37 prevention of abuse (misuse) of powers,38 
equality before the law and non-discrimination39 and access to justice.40
Moreover, the EU Court of Justice frequently relied on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights while providing an interpretation to the abovementioned 
rights and principles, as all of the EU Member States simultaneously remained the ECHR 
signatories41 and the majority of the CFREU rights correspond to the ones stemming from 
the Convention.42 The horizontal clauses of Arts. 51–53 of the Charter are specifically 
drafted to guarantee that the meaning and scope of the rights within the EU’s legal order are 
equivalent to those laid down by said Convention.43 Art. 51 CFREU has become one of the 
main provisions guaranteeing effective realisation of rights stemming from EU Law within 
the national legal systems,44 especially when considering the rapid post-Lisbon development 
of the EU’s Human Rights’ acquis with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a main 
frame of reference.
This can also be seen as one of the ways to enforce the Rule of Law principle in cases 
of the EU Member States governments misconduct.45 In particular, the first paragraph 
clarifies that ‘…the provisions of this Charter are addressed ... to the Member States only 
32 Hillion (2016) 73.
33 Hillion (2016) 65.
34 Hillion (2016) 66.
35 In this sense, see for example Hoffmann-Riem (2014) 579–97.
36 Hoffmann-Riem (2014) section A. 
37 Hoffmann-Riem (2014) section B.
38 Hoffmann-Riem (2014) section C.
39 Hoffmann-Riem (2014) section D.
40 Hoffmann-Riem (2014) section E.
41 Christoffersen (2009) 342.
42 Ferraro and Carmona, (2015) link 5.
43 Ahmed (2014) 118.
44 Jakab (2016) 187, 190.
45 Jakab (2016) 190.
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when they are implementing Union law’.46 Even though the broad scope of the Charter 
application did not stem directly from the text of Art. 51 or pertinent explanations,47 the 
CJEU proposed this interpretation in the Fransson case.48 In Fransson, the CJEU 
prominently stated that ‘...since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must […] 
be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of [EU] law, situations 
cannot exist which are covered in that way by [EU] law without those fundamental rights 
being applicable’.49 Thus, the CFREU rights are to be applicable not only when a Member 
State implements EU Law in the sense of applying it within its national legal system, but 
also when the Member State is seeking to derogate from EU Law50 – in this case, even an 
indirect connection to the Union law is considered sufficient.51
It should be mentioned that the CJEU prominently held, in the earlier Zambrano case, 
that Art. 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens 
of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union’.52 The Fransson formula read in conjunction with the 
Zambrano fuelled the discussion on its far-reaching implications for the realisation of the 
Rule of Law principle as a part of the EU values’.53 The ‘Reverse Solange’ doctrine suggests 
that the EU Charter could also be applicable in case of systemic violations of Art. 2 TEU 
within the Member States’s domestic legal system – maybe even outside the scope of EU 
Law, as the Union citizenship must entail a guarantee of last resort for fundamental rights in 
these cases.54 The ongoing systemic violations of EU Fundamental Rights in some EU 
Member States e.g., the Roma crisis in France,55 the corruption issues in Romania and 
Bulgaria,56 the Hungarian constitutional reform,57 has intensified a discussion on the scope 
of application of the Art. 7 TEU procedure.
The European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework (ROFL) was adopted in an 
attempt to strengthen the EU’s response to these abuses, within the context of the multilevel 
system of Human Rights protection within the European Union (the EU, the Council of 
Europe, and the EU Member States). This framework is supposed to be complementary to 
Art. 7 TEU and the formal infringement procedure under Art. 258 TFEU, which the 
Commission can launch if a EU Member State fails to implement a solution to clarify and 
correct the suspected violation of EU Law.58 The Commission seems to have provided a 
rather comprehensive definition of the Rule of Law principle, heavily relying both on the 
previous CJEU’s and the ECtHR’s case-law and demonstrating the EU’s adherence to 
46 Art. 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326.
47 Explanatory note concerning Article 51, Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights [2007] OJ C303/17.
48 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren. v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
49 Case C-617/10, Åklagaren. v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 21.
50 Rauchegger (2015) 97, 108.
51 Hamuák (2016) 35.
52 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para. 42.
53 Von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019). 
54 In this sense, see for example Von Bogdandy et al (2012) 489–519 ; Von Bogdandy, Antpöhler 
and Ioannidis, (2017); Jakab (2016) 192–94.
55 O’Cinneide (2013) 122.
56 Spendzharova and Vachudova (2014) 157–59.
57 Gárdos-Orosz (2018) 94, 95–97.
58 Besselink (2017).
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reaching the Council of Europe objectives.59 The ROFL elaborated on such key components 
of the Rule of Law in the EU as the general principles of legal certainty, which requires 
amongst other things that legal norms are clear and predictable and may not be changed 
retrospectively; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers guaranteeing that every 
EU or Member State intervention has a legal basis and is constrained by law; equality 
before the law, stemming from Arts. 20 and 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.60
Special emphasis was also put on the principles of legality i.e., a transparent, 
accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws, and the independence of 
the judiciary as they remain a guarantee of effective judicial review, including respect for 
fundamental rights and thus, from the broader perspective, are a prerequisite for upholding 
all rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties within national legal systems.61 
Moreover, the ROFL elaborated on the institutional dimension of the Rule of Law concept 
by introducing an early warning mechanism aimed at addressing the systemic violations of 
fundamental rights by the EU Member States which create the clear risk of a serious breach 
of the EU’s common values (Art. 2 TEU).62 A three-stage procedure precedes invoking Art. 
7 TEU, and, in principle, instigates national governments to solve the internal issues to 
make the application of the nuclear option unnecessary.
The first stage is the Commission’s assessment, during which the Commission collects 
and examines all relevant information pertaining to the situation and assesses whether a 
systemic threat to the rule of law exists. The second stage, unless the matter has already 
been satisfactorily resolved, involves the Commission issuing a rule of law recommendation 
addressed at the Member State, in order to fix the identified problems within a determined 
time limit. The third stage monitors the Member States’ follow-up on the recommendations: 
if there is no satisfactory follow-up within the time limit set, the Commission can resort to 
one of the mechanisms set out in Art. 7 TEU.63
Considering the EU’s efforts in drafting the ROFL, it could be argued that the 
possibility of invoking Art. 7 TEU has long been perceived as merely hypothetical.64 
As argued by Halmai, evidence to support this point of view is the fact that the EU heavily 
relied on the infringement proceedings of Art. 258 TFEU as a tool to push the EU Member 
States’ governments to solve pressing Rule of Law issues.65 However, Poland had been on 
the Commission’s radar for almost three years concerning its controversial reforms 
regarding the functioning of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the appointment of its 
judges, with investigations under the new Rule of Law Framework having started in January 
59 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament and Council – A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (ROFL) [2014] COM/2014/0158 final, 3.
60 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament and Council – A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (ROFL) [2014] COM/2014/0158 final 3–4, and Annex I 
‘The Rule of law as a foundational principle of the Union’.
61 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament and Council – A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (ROFL) [2014] COM/2014/0158 final 4.
62 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament and Council – A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (ROFL) [2014] COM/2014/0158 final 6.
63 Communication from the Commission to European Parliament and Council – A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (ROFL) [2014] COM/2014/0158 final 7–9.
64 In this sense, see for example Taborowski (2018) 238–39; Eppler/Hackhofer/Maurer (2018) 
75–79; Šišková (2016) 805–13.
65 Halmai (2018) 3.
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2016. The Hungarian government had been heavily criticised from 2011 on, when the new 
constitution was adopted and a series of following legal and political changes led to the 
violation of the independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression, rights of migrants 
and refugees, corruption, and the rights of minorities.66
The ongoing EU’s dialogue with the Hungarian and Polish governments, as well as the 
numerous infringement proceedings aimed at addressing the abovementioned challenges 
proved to be ineffective67 as the European Commission (Poland) and the Parliament 
(Hungary) were forced to submit the reasoned proposals calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Art. 7(1) TEU, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland and 
Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded. The CJEU’s case-law (LM/ML, 
Torubarov lines of reasoning, as well as Polish judgements on the judicial system reform) 
seems to carefully approach the Rule of Law concept as well, in order to create the 
framework for the Article 7 TEU mechanism application in the future. It will be submitted 
that, due to the exceptional circumstances of these cases – namely invoking Art. 7 TEU for 
the first time in history, the legal reasoning adopted by the Commission, Parliament and the 
CJEU is crucial regardless of the Council’s yes/no decision(s) in the cases at hand. Generally 
speaking, the EU’s rhetoric on Poland and Hungary is likely to demonstrate if the Rule of 
Law concept can address effectively the threats to the EU’s core values from the Member 
States’ conduct – on the current stage of the Union’s legal integration.
3. ART. 7 TEU VS. POLAND AND HUNGARY:  
DOES LEGAL REASONING MATTER?
The independence of the judiciary is considered one of the key elements of the EU’s Rule 
of Law principle, in view of its importance for the effective judicial protection of the EU’s 
individual, as well as the proper enforcement of the EU Law provisions within national 
legal systems. The Venice Commission Opinion no. 663/2012 on the independence of the 
judiciary, as regulated by Act CLXII of 2011, regarding the lowering of the retirement age 
for Hungarian judges to 62 years and subsequent decision of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court declaring these changes unconstitutional resulted in the Commission lodging an 
infringement procedure on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU.
In Commission v Hungary, the CJEU carefully avoided a single mention of the judicial 
independence notion in the judgement. At this point, the Court preferred to address the 
issue through the lens of non-discrimination at the workplace, however establishing the 
violation of Arts. 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 (Employment Equality Framework 
Directive) due to the disproportionate and unjustified discrimination on grounds of age.68 
The ROFL Framework mechanism was not applied despite these worrying signs as well as 
other indications of the Rule of Law violations by the Fidesz government. This is a clear 
difference from the Polish case where, in the course of the dialogue with the Polish 
government within the framework of the ROFL three-stage procedure, the Commission 
66 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 51–61.
67 In this sense, see Pech and Wachowiec (2019) link 6.
68 Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687, paras. 74–81.
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adopted four Recommendations between July 2016 and December 2017.69 The main points 
of critique were
(1) the election procedure of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal judges,
(2) the independence of the judiciary in view of the laws on the Supreme Court, on the 
National Council for the Judiciary and on Ordinary Courts Organisation,
(3) the overall compliance of the ongoing judicial reform with common European 
standards and guarantees of judicial independence, including the Council of Europe 
benchmarks.
The CJEU also demonstrated its growing awareness of worrying developments in 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP) concerning the austerity measures 
leading to pay cuts for civil servants, including the judiciary. One of the first attempts was 
made to invoke Art. 2 TEU (the EU’s values) in light of the EU Member States’ obligation 
to guarantee and respect the independence of their national courts and tribunals.70 The 
judgment prominently elaborated on Art. 19 TEU, read in light of Art. 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to demonstrate that the organisation of the 
national judiciary falling within the scope of EU Law in general, and Art. 2 TEU in 
particular, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law within 
the meaning of Art. 51(1) CFREU in this case.71 In order to justify this intervention and the 
development of the EU-specific principle of effective judicial review,72 the Court referred to 
the EU Member States courts competence to apply and/or interpret European Law, and the 
deriving right (or duty) to submit the requests for the CJEU’s preliminary rulings (Art. 267 
TFEU).73
The ASJP outcome shall however be seen in view of the ongoing EU’s dialogue with 
the Polish and Hungarian governments. The ROFL Framework application did not have 
fruitful results in the Polish case and led to the ultimate Union’s attempts to trigger a 
‘nuclear’ Art. 7 TEU procedure. On 20 December 2017, due to the alleged violations of the 
principle of judicial independence by the Polish government, the Commission activated the 
Art. 7(1) TEU, (clear risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values) procedure for the first 
time, and submitted a Reasoned Proposal for a Decision of the Council on the determination 
of a clear risk of a serious breach of the Rule of Law by Poland in light of the ongoing 
reform of the national judicial system. On 12 September 2018, the European Parliament 
voted in favour of launching Art. 7(1) TEU proceedings against the Hungarian government 
69 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland [2016] OJ L 217; Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 
regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2017/146 [2017] OJ 
L 22; Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland complementary to Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 and (EU) 2017/146 [2017] OJ L 228; 
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 of 20 December 2017 regarding the rule of law in 
Poland complementary to Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520 
[2018] OJ L 17. 
70 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
71 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 para. 29.
72 Pech / Platon (2018) link 7.
73 Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paras. 40–45.
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on the basis of a report prepared by MEP Judit Sargentini, listing multiple alleged 
inconsistencies of the Hungarian legislation with the EU’s acquis.
Hungary promptly initiated the action for annulment of the European Parliament’s 
resolution on the Art. 7 TEU proposal relying on four pleas in law. First, only the votes for 
and against were counted, excluding abstentions, which is contrary to Art. 354 TFEU and 
Art. 178(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. Secondly, 
the President of the European Parliament did not consult the European Parliament 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs in relation to the interpretation of the rules of procedure, 
despite that before the vote there had been justified doubts as to the method of counting 
expressed in the opinion of the European Parliament’s Legal Service to the President of 
7 September 2018.
Thirdly, the EU Parliament Members could not exercise their rights necessary 
for carrying out their duties of representing the people in accordance 
with the principle of democracy, which includes the possibility of abstention. Fourthly, 
the contested resolution infringes the principles of sincere cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU), 
legitimate expectations and legal certainty, since the resolution contains 
statements which refer to infringement proceedings which have already been concluded 
or are still ongoing.74 The case is pending at time of writing, however, the CJEU 
has touched upon the two first pleas in the recent Order of 14 May 2019 – the opinion of 
the European Parliament’s Legal Service of September 7, 2018 was removed from the file. 
According to the Court, even though the opinion in question was arguably obtained 
from the website,75 the disclosure of this document had not been authorized by the 
Parliament.76 Hence, the recourse to the opinion in question would run counter to the 
requirements of a fair trial and would amount to circumventing the procedure for requesting 
access to such a document in accordance with Regulation No. 1049/2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (Transparency 
Regulation).77
The final outcome of Hungary v European Parliament is still unknown (at the time of 
writing). However, if the European Parliament’s resolution from 12 September 2018 will be 
retained, it is for the Council to determine whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach 
by both Member States of the common EU’s values referred to in Art. 2 TEU such as the 
rule of law and respect for human rights.78 As argued by Bard and Carrera, the provisions of 
Art. 7 set a very high threshold inside the Council in order to activate the procedure: a four-
fifths majority is needed to invoke the preventive arm, whereas the sanctioning arm can be 
vetoed by any EU Member State.79 However, regardless of the Council yes/no decisions in 
the Polish and Hungarian cases, the submissions of the Commission and the Parliament are 
likely to have a significant impact on the development of the Rule of Law concept in EU 
Law.
74 Case C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament (action brought on 17 October 2018).
75 Case C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament (action brought on 17 October 2018). Order from 14 
May 2019, para. 17. 
76 Case C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament (action brought on 17 October 2018). Order from 14 
May 2019, paras. 8–9.
77 Case C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament (action brought on 17 October 2018). Order from 14 
May 2019, paras. 10–14.
78 Art. 7(1) TEU.
79 Carrera and Bárd (2018) link 8.
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The legal reasoning of the proposals does not seem completely coherent as the 
Commission’s reasoning (Poland) is rather well founded, while the Parliament’s 
argumentation (Hungary) seems incomparably less convincing and more policy-oriented. 
Moreover, the view taken by the Parliament in its attempt to trigger Art. 7 TEU questions 
the substance of the Rule of Law concept in the EU by adding the components of purely 
socio-economic nature to the latter notion, which was always interpreted primarily in the 
shadow of the Council of Europe (ECHR-based) benchmarks, even though considering the 
EU’s objectives and legal machinery.80
For instance, the Commission’s analysis of the Polish case elaborates on
(a) the lack of an independent and legitimate constitutional review,
(b) the threats to the independence of the ordinary judiciary.
While discussing the Constitutional Tribunal reform, the Commission demonstrates its 
adherence to the comprehensive overview of pertinent Polish legislation offered by ROFL 
Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520.81 The issue of 
independence of ordinary judges is discussed in detail as well, with special emphasis on 
Art. 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR’s case-law (Campbell, Urban, Fruni lines of 
reasoning), the 2010 CoE Recommendation and by the Reports of the European Commission 
for Democracy through Law (‘Venice Commission’) previously made on the Polish reform 
of judiciary.82
Regarding the content of the Parliament’s proposal, the Sargentini report described a 
multiplicity of issues either in light of the Rule of Law concept e.g., the judiciary reform,83 
the legislation on the constitutional and electoral systems,84 the right to equal treatment,85 
the Human Rights of minorities, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees,86 or as closely 
80 Von Danwitz (2014) 1320–21.
81 The Proposal of the European Commission for a Council decision on the determination of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law [2017] COM 835 final, 
paras. 26–39, 40–55, 56–90.
82 The Proposal of the European Commission for a Council decision on the determination of a 
clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law [2017] COM 835 final, 
paras. 94–96, 98, 116, 120–127, 132–136 etc.
83 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 12–19.
84 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 7–11.
85 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 46–50.
86 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 51–72.
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inter-connected and deriving ones e.g., corruption issues,87 privacy and data protection,88 
freedom of expression,89 academic independence,90 freedom of religion and association,91 
or the abolition of economic and social rights.92 The report covers the cases that were closed 
several years ago since the violation has been arguably eliminated by the Hungarian 
government e.g., the reform of the laws on the retirement of judges in view of the CJEU’s 
Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary 93 or the civil code reforms, in light of the ECtHR’s 
Gaszó v Hungary, App. No. 48322/12.94
Moreover, the scope of the report also seems questionable in light of its purpose of 
triggering Art. 7 (1) TEU (i.e., violation of the EU Rule of Law principle or fundamental 
EU values).95 The references to the legislation on the conflicts of interest of the Hungarian 
Parliament members could serve as illustrative examples in this regard. The Sargentini 
report specifically elaborates on the tougher set of rules in the area of economic conflict of 
interest for the members of the Hungarian parliament – accompanied by a more robust 
obligation to submit asset declarations.96 The Parliament submissions also include an 
Economic and social rights section where the legislation allowing local authorities to punish 
87 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 20–24.
88 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 25–26.
89 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 27–32.
90 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 33–36.
91 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 37–45.
92 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340., 
paras. 73–77.
93 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 15.
94 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
paras. 16.
95 UJHELYI (2018) link 9.
96 UJHELYI (2018) link 9.
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homelessness or the child’s rights were discussed in view of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights and the UN Working Group on discrimination against 
women in law and in practice reports. However there was no convincing analysis of current 
factual circumstances in light of these documents.97
Considering the significant differences in the approach taken by the European 
Commission and the Parliament in the Polish and Hungarian cases, as well as the socio-
economic components of the Sargentini report, one could possibly indicate another 
emerging issue – namely, a presumable ineffectiveness of the Rule of Law concept as a tool 
to address the multiplicity of challenges arising on the present stage of the EU’s legal 
integration. The minority Opinion to the Parliament’s report might serve as an additional 
evidence of this: elaboration on the attempts of the Hungarian government to resolve social 
problems was considered inconsistent with the final rationale of Art. 7 TEU mechanism, 
and thus leading to dividing the European Union and deepening its crisis.98
4. THE RULE OF LAW BEYOND ART. 7 TEU –  
THE CJEU’S INTERVENTION
Beyond the Commission’s and the Parliament’s proposals aiming to trigger Art. 7 TEU 
mechanism, the evolving body of the CJEU’s jurisprudence with the Rule of Law 
component adds complexity to the overall picture. Recent European Arrest Warrant cases 
(LM,99 ML),100 the ongoing proceedings concerning the reform of the Polish judicial 
system,101 or the request of the Hungarian court on the scope of the right to an effective 
remedy in the asylum procedures (Torubarov)102 can serve as the illustrative examples in 
this respect.
In LM and ML, the Court attempted to clarify the borders of mutual trust between the 
judicial authorities of the EU Member States, in view of the systemic violations of the Art. 
2 TEU values, including the Rule of Law principle. The contested provisions were Art. 1(3) 
of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision aiming at ensuring the respect 
for fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 [TEU] in 
course of the Warrant execution, and Arts. 3, 4 and 4a of Framework Decision 2002/584 
which set out the grounds for mandatory or optional refusal of a European arrest warrant. 
These cases develop the earlier Aranyosi/Căldăraru line of reasoning, where the CJEU 
clarified that the refusal to execute the European Arrest Warrant required the two-stage test:
(a) determining the risk of breach of fundamental rights in general, due to general or 
systemic deficiencies in the remedies provided in the issuing Member State
(b) the risk-exposure of the individual concerned in the specific case.103
  97 UJHELYI (2018) link 9.
  98 Minority Opinion pursuant to Rule 52a(4) of the Rules of Procedure Marek Jurek, Beata 
Gosiewska, Mylène Troszczynski, Auke Zijlstra, Barbara Kappel.
  99 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
100 Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie)/ ML 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:58.
101 Case C-619/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland (action brought on 2 October 
2018).
102 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017).
103 Joined cases C-404/ 15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pal Aranyosi (C-404/15) and Robert Caldararu 
(C-659/15 PPU) [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, paras. 88–100.
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The LM case creates a framework for the Aranyosi/Căldăraru test application in cases 
of the ongoing proceedings under Art. 7(1) TEU mechanism, and thus the presumable 
existence of the clear risk of a serious breach of the Rule of Law. The Irish Court submitted 
a request for a preliminary reference to the CJEU to clarify if the evidence on (a) the lack of 
an independent and legitimate constitutional review and (b) the threats to the independence 
of the ordinary judiciary documented by a number of international and European institutions 
and bodies, and mentioned by the Commission’s report in the Polish case might be 
considered sufficient ground for non-execution of the European Arrest Warrant due to the 
alleged breach of the applicant’s right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal 
guaranteed by Art. 47 CFREU.104
Advocate General Tanchev emphasised that the right to a fair trial, also stemming from 
corresponding Art. 6 of the European Convention, might be subject to limitations, unless 
these limitations are so severe that the essence of that right is violated.105 In the given 
circumstances, in order for the executing authority to postpone surrender, there must be a 
real risk not of a breach of the right to a fair trial but of ‘a flagrant denial of justice’. 
In order to illustrate the practical applicability of this test, the Advocate General elaborated 
on the ECtHR’s case-law establishing the Art. 6 ECHR breach regarding the independence 
of the courts (Al Nashiri line of reasoning).106
The CJEU preferred to skip these arguments and provided a very modest response, 
refusing to accept a clear risk of a serious breach of EU values i.e., Art. 7(1) TEU as a 
benchmark.107 Rather, the Court allowed for derogating from the mutual trust principle only 
in cases of activating the sanctioning arms of Arts. 7(2)–(3) (serious and persistent breach 
of the common EU’s values) by the European Council – in order to invoke recital 10 EAW 
(Suspension of the Warrant) on the first stage of the Aranayosi test.108 Until such a decision 
is made, the executing court can derogate from executing the EAW on the basis of Art. 1(3) 
of the Framework Decision only in exceptional circumstances – if the supplementary 
information received from the issuing judicial authority allows to establish the existence of 
that risk for the individual concerned.109
The twin judgment in the ML case confirms this premise, limiting the Aranyosi 
assessment of detention conditions in Hungary (the issuing Member State) to the first 
prisons in which the person concerned will be held immediately after the surrender on the 
basis of the European Arrest Warrant.110 The Court reaffirmed that mutual trust is one of the 
key principles of the EU legal order, stemming from a set of common values on which the 
Union is founded, as stated in Art. 2 TEU and that it can only cease to operate in exceptional 
104 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
paras. 18–25.
105 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 28 June 2018. Case C-216/18 PPU, 
Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:517, paras. 75–81.
106 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 28 June 2018. Case C-216/18 PPU, 
Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:517, paras. 86–96.
107 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
paras. 61–69.
108 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
paras. 70–73.
109 Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality/ LM [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, 
para. 77.
110 Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie)/ ML 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:58, paras. 77–89.
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circumstances.111 However, the Court specifically mentioned that it is not going to rule on 
the existence of systemic or generalized deficiencies in detention conditions in the 
Hungarian prisons.112 Just like in the Aranyosi/Căldăraru cases, the CJEU left the core of 
the mutual trust concept in EU Law intact113 and therefore avoided granting national courts 
a realistic possibility to declare the Framework Decision invalid, for being in contrast with 
the EU’s fundamental rights – at least on the basis of the ongoing investigations under Art. 
7 TEU .114
It could be argued that solving the LM and ML cases was a complex task for the CJEU 
as it required the politically-neutral approach before the final decisions on Art. 7(1) TEU in 
the Polish and Hungarian case. This line of reasoning is also important in light of another 
issue of crucial importance, the effectiveness of judicial review in the asylum cases. Since 
2015, the Hungarian courts can namely either uphold or annul but cannot change the 
decision of the asylum authority. Hence, the asylum procedures, and consequently, the 
unlawful detention in the transit zones, do not have a maximum time limit in practice.115 
This is one of the sensitive issues mentioned by the Sargentini report.116 The Hungarian 
judges were reluctant to question the legitimacy of the national asylum legislation reform 
and continued to participate in their application – even though the ECtHR found some of 
the solutions to be contrary to International Law.117
The preliminary ruling request submitted by the Pécs City Administrative and Labour 
Court in the Torubarov case is de facto the first attempt to challenge this system 
substantively. The court asked to clarify if Art. 46 (3) Directive 2013/32 (Asylum Procedures 
Directive) in conjunction with Art. 47 CFREU (The right to a fair trial and an effective 
remedy) allows for Hungarian courts to amend administrative decisions of the competent 
asylum authority refusing international protection and also to grant such protection.118 
Advocate General Bobek made a detailed reference to the recent Alheto case concerning the 
interpretation of Art. 46(3) of the Asylum Procedures Directive119 and reiterated the main 
findings of that judgment:
(a) Directive 2013/32 does not determine a particular way in which this provision 
should be implemented, and the EU Member States choose that decisions may be altered, or 
they can opt for cassation
(b) such a review must be a comprehensive, assessing both issues of law and fact.120
111 Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie)/ ML 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:58, paras. 46–50.
112 Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie)/ ML 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:58, paras. 67–71.
113 Gáspár-Szilágyi (2016) 215–16.
114 The European University Institute Centre For Judicial Cooperation (2016) link 10.
115 Nagy (2018) 48–50.
116 The European Parliament resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, 
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious 
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded [2018] P8_TA-PROV(2018)0340, 
para. 66–72.
117 Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, App. No. 47287/15 (ECtHR, 14 March 2017).
118 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017).
119 Case C-585/16, Serin Alheto v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:584.
120 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017). 
Opinion of Advocate General Bobek [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:335, paras. 39–47.
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Predictably, the Advocate General also addressed the question in light of the Rule of 
Law concept which was seen as the part of the wider constitutional and fundamental rights 
considerations that are of significance for the case121 – even though avoiding directly 
mentioning the ongoing Art. 7 TEU procedure. The Opinion de facto follows the logic of 
the Sargentini report, also considering the effectiveness of a judicial protection in the 
asylum cases (stemming from Art. 19(1) TEU and Art. 47 CFREU) through the prism of 
the systemic, structural rule of law concerns’.122 In view of the crucial role of effective 
judicial review in preserving the Rule of Law in any legal system, this set of guarantees 
shall apply to any area of EU Law being implemented at the national level, including 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection.123 Hence, the 
current Hungarian legislative framework arguably fails to meet the requirements of effective 
judicial review set out in Art. 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 and interpreted in the light of 
Art. 47(1) CFREU.124
The CJEU’s Grand Chamber generally followed these suggestions but the cautionary 
reasoning of the Torubarov judgement makes a clear distinction from the far-reaching AG 
Opinion. This approach can be explained by the sensitive nature of the ongoing proceedings 
under Art. 7 TEU against the Hungarian government, as well as the special importance of 
the request, i.e., challenging the compatibility of the key component of the Hungarian 
asylum system, the appeal system, with EU Law. The judges prominently avoided to 
explore the conduct of the Hungarian immigration authorities through the prism of the 
systemic Rule of Law concerns. Rather, the question of the Pécs City Administrative and 
Labour Court was addressed from the perspective of the direct effect of EU Law in the 
asylum matters.
The CJEU focused on the analysis of rationales and wording of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive; referring to the above-mentioned Alheito, the Court emphasised that Art. 46(3) 
defines the scope of the right to an effective remedy by specifying that the EU Members 
States must ensure that the court before which the decision relating to the application for 
international protection is contested, carries out a full and ex nunc examination of both facts 
and points of law, including new facts and evidence.125 Moreover, even though Directive 
2013/32 affords EU Member States some discretion in organising the appeal system in the 
asylum cases, the national implementing legislation shall comply with the principle of 
effective judicial protection which is enshrined in Art. 47 CFREU126 and constitutes the 
very essence of EU law.127 Hence, Art. 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 would be deprived of 
any practical effect if it were accepted that, after delivery of a judgment in which the court 
conducted, in accordance with that provision, a comprehensive assessment of the application 
for international protection of the applicant, the administrative body referred to in Art. 2(f) 
121 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017). 
Opinion of Advocate General Bobek [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:335, para. 38.
122 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017). 
Opinion of Advocate General Bobek [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:335, para. 58.
123 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017). 
Opinion of Advocate General Bobek [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:335, para. 125.
124 Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Request for a preliminary ruling made on 22 September 2017). 
Opinion of Advocate General Bobek [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:335, para. 126.
125 Case C-556/17, Torubarov  [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:626, para. 51.
126 Case C-556/17, Torubarov  [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:626, para. 55
127 Case C-556/17, Torubarov  [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:626, para. 73.
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of Directive 2013/32 (determining authority) could take a decision that ran counter to that 
assessment.128
In view of these considerations, the CJEU prominently declared that, under the 
circumstances of the case, the courts shall have the power to overturn administrative 
decisions in granting of international protection disapplying – if necessary – the national 
law that would prohibit them from proceeding in that way.129 It could be said that the CJEU 
elaborated substantively on the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal (Art. 
47 CFREU) ‘as shield against the national governments limitation of judicial reformatory 
powers’, thus opening the floor for new claims within the context of asylum and immigration 
adjudication, even though not directly referring to the Art. 7(1) TEU procedure.130
The ongoing infringement proceedings on the Law on Ordinary Courts131 concerning 
the establishment of different retirement ages for female and male judges in Poland, which 
the Commission finds to be contrary to Art. 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 (‘Gender 
Equality Directive’) and on the Law on the Supreme Court132 regarding Polish legislation 
on lowering of the retirement age for Supreme Court judges, as well as the pending request 
for a preliminary ruling on national measures establishing the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court133 do not add consistency to the Rule of Law principle interpretation or 
application either.
On 24 June 2019, the CJEU released the first judgement in this series of the Rule of 
Law cases regarding the ongoing reform of the Polish judicial system.134 Arts. 37 and 111 
of the New Law on the Supreme Court lowered the mandatory retirement age for Supreme 
Court judges – including those in office – from 70 to 65 and provided the President of the 
Republic with a discretion to extend the judges mandate beyond the newly established 
retirement age.135 Heavily relying on the earlier ASJP/ LM judgements, the Commission 
stated that these measures failed to meet the requirement of judicial independence, which 
remains a key component of the fundamental right to a fair trial stemming from combined 
reading of Art. 19(1) TEU and Art. 47 CFREU.136 The Republic of Poland argued that the 
infringement proceedings should be discontinued as all national provisions challenged by 
the Commission in its action have been repealed, and their effects eliminated, by the Law 
amending the New Law on the Supreme Court of 21 November 2018.137
128 Case C-556/17, Torubarov  [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:626, paras. 58, 76.
129 Case C-556/17, Torubarov  [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:626, paras. 73–79.
130 Moraru / Strazzari / Penasca (2017) link 11.
131 Case C-192/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland (action brought on 15 March 
2018).
132 Case C-619/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland (action brought on 2 October 
2018).
133 Joined Cases C585/18, C624/18 and C625/18, A.K. (C585/18) v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa 
and CP (C624/18), DO (C625/18) v Sąd Najwyższy (C624/18 and C625/18), joined party 
Prokurator Generalny zastępowany przez Prokuraturę Krajową (Request for a preliminary ruling 
from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 20 September 2018).
134 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
135 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 9–14.
136 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, para. 1, 34.
137 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 27–28. 
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However, the CJEU found it necessary to elaborate on the Commission’s submissions 
on the basis of the position in which the Member State at issue found itself at the end of the 
period laid down in the reasoned opinion, in accordance with the previously settled case-
law.138 Following the AG Tanchev Opinion, the CJEU declared the national legislation 
incompatible with Art. 19(1) TEU, which obliges the EU Member States to provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.139 
The legal reasoning of the Court presents a special interest in this regard.
First, the national courts are defined as the guarantors of proper realization of the Art. 
2 TEU values, including the rule of law, in the EU Member States.140
Secondly, the CJEU seems to have further developed the ASJP approach by adding an 
additional step in assessment of the possible limitations to the judicial independence:141 
‘given that these national measures are justified and proportionate, they shall not affect the 
imperviousness of the court concerned to external factors and its neutrality with respect to 
the interests before it’.142
Thirdly, in light of the ‘Reverse Solange’ concerns of the Polish and Hungarian 
governments, the Court emphasized that the material scope of Art. 19(1) TEU refers to the 
fields covered by Union law – irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing 
Union law within the meaning of Art. 51(1) of the EU Charter.143
Thus, even though Art. 51(1) CFREU does not extend the scope of application of EU 
Law beyond the European Union’s competences, the EU Member States shall ensure that 
the organisation and functioning of the bodies which, courts or tribunals within the meaning 
of EU Law,144 meet the requirements stemming from the EU-specific principle of effective 
judicial review, including the guarantees of judicial independence.145 The key rationales for 
this choice is the special role of the national courts in the EU Law enforcement:
(a) ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the 
Union Law through the duty of consistent interpretation146
(b) participation in judicial dialogue with the EU Court of Justice through the 
preliminary ruling procedure (Art. 267 TFEU).147
The expected judgements in two other Polish cases concerning the ongoing judicial 
reform were also considered capable of limiting the EU Member States discretion as to the 
138  Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 30–31.
139 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, para. 126.
140 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 42–44.
141 Simonelli (2019 link 12. 
142 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, para. 79.
143 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 50–52.
144 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 53–57.
145 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 58–59.
146 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras. 42–44.
147 Case C619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, para. 45.
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organisation of their judiciaries.148 The same AG (Evgeni Tanchev) was appointed to pave 
the way for the Court’s analysis, hence the strongly related reasoning of both Opinions and 
them being rather similar to already adopted Opinion in the Law on the Supreme Court 
case.149 Special emphasis is put on the context of the Polish justice system reform instituted 
by measures adopted in 2017, which had already been the subject of the Commission’s 
reasoned proposal in accordance with Art. 7(1) TEU regarding the rule of law in Poland. 
According to Advocate General Tanchev, Art. 19(1) TEU shall be seen as a concrete 
manifestation of respect for the rule of law under Art. 2 TEU, with Art. 47 CFREU 
specifying the content of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law stemming from these provisions.150
After the detailed assessment of the scope of the above-mentioned guarantees and 
having considered pertinent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Advocate 
General found that
(a) the new retirement rules for judges of the Polish ordinary courts are contrary to EU 
Law since the contested measures violate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
sex and the principles of irremovability of judges and of judicial independence151
(b) the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court does not offer sufficient 
guarantees of independence under EU Law – in light of involvement of the legislative 
authorities in electing the 15 judicial members of the National Council of the Judiciary, and 
the role of that body in selecting judges eligible for appointment by the President of the 
Republic of Poland to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.152
It could be argued that the most problematic issue of this line of reasoning is the 
gravity of the intervention in the traditional area of the procedural autonomy of the EU 
Member States153 on the basis of the EU-specific principle of effective judicial review – 
which seems to be more predatory than the ASJP approach. Although a set of general rules 
to be observed while applying EU Law was established,154 the organisation, competence 
148 In this sense, see for example Rosas (2019) link 13.
149 Case C-192/18, European Commission v Republic of Poland (action brought on 15 March 
2018). Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 20 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:529; 
Joined Cases C585/18, C624/18 and C625/18, A.K. (C585/18) v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and CP 
(C624/18), DO (C625/18) v Sąd Najwyższy (C624/18 and C625/18), joined party Prokurator Generalny 
zastępowany przez Prokuraturę Krajową (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy 
(Poland) lodged on 20 September 2018). Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 27 June 
2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551.
150 Case C-192/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 20 June 2019, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:529, paras. 1–6; Joined Cases C585/18, C624/18 and C625/18, A.K. (C585/18) v 
Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and CP (C624/18), DO (C625/18) v Sąd Najwyższy (C624/18 and 
C625/18), joined party Prokurator Generalny zastępowany przez Prokuraturę Krajową, Opinion of 
Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 27 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551, paras. 1–7.
151 Case C-192/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev delivered on 20 June 2019, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:529, para. 120.
152 Joined Cases C585/18, C624/18 and C625/18, A.K. (C585/18) v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa 
and CP (C624/18), DO (C625/18) v Sąd Najwyższy (C624/18 and C625/18), joined party 
Prokurator Generalny zastępowany przez Prokuraturę Krajową, Opinion of Advocate General 
Tanchev delivered on 27 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551, para. 157.
153 Thienel (2010) 85.
154 Such as, for instance, the principles of the effectiveness and equivalence of the national 
remedies, effectives access to the court, foreseeability, legal certainty or providing reasons for judicial 
decisions. In this sense, see for example Anthony (2011) 51–70, or Ravo (2012) 103–06.
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and procedure of the national courts always remained with the national authorities.155 
It could be mentioned here that even ASJP has already had rather far-reaching consequences 
for the Hungarian judicial system.156 A wave of international critique followed this 
judgement in view of the ongoing reform of administrative courts system. On 12 December 
2018, the Hungarian Parliament passed two laws establishing a separate system of 
administrative courts, with its own high court and its own judicial council that  was set to 
begin its operation on 1 January 2020 and would have been supervised by the Minister of 
Justice.157
For instance, the analysis presented by the Venice Commission report mentions that 
the Minister of Justice is given a central role, with commensurate powers, in determining of 
the scale of those courts, the selection of future judges and the first heads of court158 – 
which raise concerns on the separation of judicial and executive powers in Hungary.159 As a 
result, the Hungarian government decided to repeal the act passed in December 2018, 
mentioning that all statements made in connection with the administrative courts are null 
and void.160 The explanatory note on the proposal to repeal the Act on Administrative 
Courts states that this amendment aims to guarantee that the ongoing reform of the 
administrative justice does not hamper the efforts of reassuringly settling the disputes about 
the unfounded criticisms against Hungary’s rule-of-law situation.161 Thus, the impact of the 
CJEU’s Polish Rule of Law decisions is likely to be even more significant as the courts 
reform remains a central point of the Commission’s proposal to invoke Art. 7 TEU 
procedure and, more generally, of the continuing political EU’s dialogue with the Polish 
government.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper sheds light on the substance of the Rule of Law concept in EU Law, the legal 
reasoning adopted by the European Commission (Poland) and by the Parliament (Hungary) 
proposals in accordance with Art. 7(1) TEU submitted to the Council. Moreover, the author 
discusses the parallel developments in the CJEU’s case-law – such as the LM/ML, Torubarov 
lines of reasoning as well as the judgements on the ongoing reform of the Polish Supreme 
Court and Ordinary courts. The main arguments were that the legal reasoning adopted by 
the key EU’s institutions – the European Commission, Parliament and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union – does not seem to be coherent or completely consistent with the 
benchmarks previously developed in the ROFL Framework (2014) or the Venice 
Commission Checklist (2016).
155 Art. 5 TEU. In this sense, see for example Galetta (2018) link 14. 
156 Kovaks ( 2019) link 15. 
157 Act CXXXI of 2018 on the entry into force of the Act on administrative courts and certain 
transitional rules (repealed by Act LXI of 2019 on 9 July 2019).
158 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Hungary: 
Opinion on the law on administrative courts and on the law on the entry into force of the law on 
administrative courts and certain transitional rules. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 118th 
Plenary Session (Venice, 15–16 March 2019) CDL-AD(2019)004, 8–20. 
159 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Hungary: 
Opinion on the law on administrative courts and on the law on the entry into force of the law on 
administrative courts and certain transitional rules. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 118th 
Plenary Session (Venice, 15–16 March 2019) CDL-AD(2019)004, 24–26.
160 Act LXI of 2019 postponing the entry into force of the Act on administrative courts (as in 
force on 9 July 2019).
161 Biro (2019) link 16.
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The Commission’s proposal is based on sound legal reasoning and thoughtful analysis 
of the Polish legislation on the judicial reform, while the arguments revealed by the 
Sargentini report, covering also factors of socio-economic nature (the legislation on 
the conflicts of interest of the Hungarian Parliament members, homelessness, unemployment 
benefits) seems less convincing in view of the scope and substance of Arts. 2 and 7 TEU. 
Although the legal reasoning of the European Parliament’s submissions could be questioned, 
the legitimacy of the report seems to be beyond doubt. However, for the report to pass, 
it required the backing of an absolute majority of MEPs and a two-thirds majority in the vote 
itself.162 The text was approved with 448 votes in favour, 197 against and only 
48 abstentions.163 Hungary made an attempt to favour the reconsideration of the vote 
outcome164 but the Government’s argumentation does not seem convenient i.e., the 
European Parliament violated its own rules of procedure while adopting the Sargentini 
report.165
This is a possible indication of the deeper issue – the questionable effectiveness of the 
Rule of Law concept as a tool to address the multiple challenges (including socio-economic 
issues) arising on the current stage of the Union’s legal integration. Regardless of the 
outcomes of the Polish and Hungarian cases, these first attempts to invoke the ‘nuclear 
option’ of Art. 7 TEU are likely to leave more questions than answers for the EU Member 
States. In view of this premise, the application of the LM/ML formula could be rather 
problematic. The CJEU’s step away (‘a real risk of an infringement of the right to a fair 
trial’) from the European Convention-based benchmarks of the assessment of the right to a 
fair trial violation (‘real risk of a flagrant denial of justice’) might potentially require further 
interventions from both of the European Courts.
The CJEU’s first attempts to tackle these challenges also demonstrated a lack of 
consistency in the judicial practice. In the Torubarov case, the CJEU carefully avoided 
mentioning the Rule of Law concept and maintained a middle-ground attitude whilst 
elaborating on the right of the asylum seekers to an effective remedy (Art. 46 of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive) primarily in light of the direct effect of EU Law within 
national legal systems. At the same time, the Court’s defensive approach towards the 
judicial independence as an integral part of the Rule of Law principle in EU Law is likely to 
add more complexity to the overall picture. The outcomes of the earlier ASJP case already 
had very significant impact on the EU Member State’s domestic laws – such as, for instance, 
the abolishment (or at least a postponement) of the administrative courts reform in Hungary. 
In any case – as indicated by the Law on the Supreme Court case – the CJEU is likely to 
further develop the ASJP approach while making final decisions in subsequent cases on the 
judicial system reform in Poland, providing rather generous guarantees of judicial 
independence – thus paving the way to the Council decision(s) on the launch of Art. 7 TEU 
procedure in the Polish and/or Hungarian cases.
162 Art. 7 TEU.
163 [Text adopted by Parliament, single reading] European Parliament resolution of 12 
September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values 
on which the Union is founded (European Parliament Official Website, 12 September 2018) <https://
oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1552104&t=e&l=en> accessed 31 July 
2019.
164 Case C-650/18, Hungary v Parliament (action brought on 17 October 2018).
165 Kochenov and Bard (2019) 5.
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